Prosecutor and lawyers in plea bargaining with complete information

被引：0
|
作者：
Delacote, Philippe [1 ]
Ancelot, Lydie [2 ]
机构：
[1] INRA, AgroParisTech, LEF, Paris, France
[2] Univ Nancy, CNRS, BETA, Nancy, France
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2009年 / 29卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In criminal law, when a conflict is solved by plea bargaining, the negotiation is mainly made between the prosecutor and the lawyer. Adopting a complete information framework about his type (selfish or altruistic), this paper compares two lawyer payment systems: flat fees and hourly-wage fees. We identify the system of fees in which the sentence is the lowest. We first show that under flat fees the prosecutor provides less effort when he faces an altruistic lawyer. Second, we show that under some conditions an altruistic lawyer may accept a higher sentence than a selfish lawyer.
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页码：1925 / 1932
页数：8
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