TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM: A SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBLEM OF COGNOSCIBILITY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS

The aim of this paper is to present transcendental idealism (and empirical realism) as a transcendental semantics that allows to solve cognitive problems of science and decide on philosophical problems through new arguments and textual documents of Kantian philosophy. For this, we intend to show that the fundamental question that appears throughout the course of Kant's work is to question the possibility of synthetic propositions. This question requires the development of a response that essentially concerns not only about its necessity and logical possibility, but also about its feasibility and show their peculiarities in each case. Specifically, the first critical conditions or ingredients of judgment distinguish between phenomena as knowledge objects and things in themselves. Thus, the transcendental idealism is defined in the narrowly, in Critique of pure reason, basically, from the way of interpreting the role of sensitivity in relation to the categories and the constitution of the objects of knowledge. This philosophical position allows Kant to propose a field of meaning which formulate and solve cognitive problems and valid, hence solving problems that reason itself imposes itself as well as make a refutation of idealism (material) somewhat problematic as dogmatic. Thus, we intend to prove that the problem of discernibility of objects is solved in Kant decisively in semantic terms.