MORE ON QUINE DILEMMA OF UNDERDETERMINATION

Quine's doctrine of underdetermination of physical theory presents him with a dilemma: Should he say of two global theory formulations that are empirically equivalent, logically compatible, equally simple, but which cannot be rendered logically equivalent by any known reconstrual of predicates, that they are both true (the ecumenical view) or that only one of them is true (the sectarian view)? If the former, then Quine's commitment to naturalism is at risk; if the latter, then his commitment to empiricism is at risk. When confronted with the dilemma Quine initially opted for the sectarian view. A.C. Genova finds Quine's sectarian resolution of the dilemma unsatisfactory. He advocates, instead, an ecumenical resolution of the dilemma which, he maintains, is compatible with Quine's (and Davidson's) most prominent views. I disagree; I argue that Genova's way out involves a relativistic notion of true that is incompatible with Quine's (and Davidson's) absolutist view of truth. I then present Quine's latest thoughts on the dilemma of underdetermination. Copyright © 1991, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved