Anti-Realism

被引:1
|
作者
David, Marian [1 ]
机构
[1] Graz Univ, Inst Philosophie, Heinrichstr 26-V, A-8010 Graz, Austria
来源
关键词
Anti-realism; correspondence-truth; comparing; Kant; realism;
D O I
10.2478/disp-2016-0010
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial assumptions.
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收藏
页码:173 / 185
页数:13
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