Pushing the bad away: reverse Tullock contests

被引:0
|
作者
Rockenbach, Bettina [1 ]
Schneiders, Sebastian [2 ]
Waligora, Marcin [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Chair Behav Econ, Albertus Magnus Pl, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[2] Univ Cologne, Cologne Grad Sch Management Econ & Social Sci, Albertus Magnus Pl, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[3] Frontier Econ Ltd, Zollhafen 24, D-50678 Cologne, Germany
来源
关键词
Rent-seeking; Contest; Loss aversion; Experiment;
D O I
10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The literature on rent-seeking primarily focuses on contests for achieving gains, although contests for avoiding losses are also omnipresent. Examples for such 'reverse' contests are activities to prevent the close-down of a local school or the construction of a waste disposal close-by. While under standard preferences, investments in 'reverse' and 'conventional' contests should not be different, loss aversion predicts contests for avoiding losses to be fiercer than conventional ones. In our experimental data, the difference in investments between conventional and reverse Tullock contests is small and statistically insignificant. We discuss several explanations for this remarkable finding.
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页码:73 / 85
页数:13
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