STRATEGIC CHOICE OF WAITING AND REACTION-TIMES IN BARGAINING

被引：0
|
作者：
STAHL, DO
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, University of Texas, Austin
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1993年 / 43卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(93)90130-5
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
If two players first commit to waiting times in a Sakovics bargaining technology, and then bargain over the division of a known surplus, zero waiting times are not subgame perfect choices, and any division of the surplus is possible.
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页码：31 / 34
页数：4
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