There is no country in which the state ownership comprising a prevailing majority of the country's enterprises might be sold in such a way that its price would be equal to the money equivalent produced in that country (to put it in another way, the ownership cannot be sold in the internal market). This is due not only to the fact that there is almost an absolute lack of money funds at the beginning of the transformation process (let us note that all financial savings of the CSFR population formed just a small part of the price of the assets privatized and they were fully engaged in the credit system), but a usual capital structure imposes restraints upon it, as well. As a matter of fact there is no country in which disposable financial capital would be equal to the total price of its existing enterprises (and even if this be the case it would be impossible to sell all the enterprises at once). Despite of it, the privatization by sale has begun and goes on, the sale is forced by different forms of a ''savage'', uncontrolled and spontaneous privatization (based upon the transfer from state enterprises) for which the privatization sales are the only possible form of obtaining the title ownership. Voucher privatization cannot avoid the sales either even if it is used primarily for the reason (among others) that lack of money funds restricts the sale of the state enterprises. They are initiated by the spontaneous interest even during the voucher privatization organized by state when the investment privatization funds begin to buy the coupon vouchers first, and the shares later on. It seems to be evident that the assets privatized in this way must also be realized by way of money exchanges. The paper analyses the way in which the exchange process evoked by privatization can be realized in despite of the fact that it encounters indisputable barriers. The solutions are mostly of a spontaneous character. They are characteristic of an outstanding deformation of the purchase-and-sale processes. In the author's opinion, however, the most serious consequences for economic development arise from the fact that the accompanying privatization processes, analyzed above, for a long time (1) freeze the critical volume of the produced resources (to pay for privatization) the investment use of which is preconditioned by overwhelming the depression state and a turn to revival, and (2) paralyte the creation of market environment with competition and a strong budget limitation which should stimulate saving and innovation and lead to a rational resources allocation, to the desired structural changes and to other effects that are expected to occur within the scope of the economic system transformation.
