Securitization and Chinese Climate Change Policy

Purpose The efforts of the securitization of climate change have been witnessed since 2007 at both international and national level. While the effectiveness of those securitization efforts needs to be further assessed, the security implications of climate change have come to be recognized at both levels. In the above context, this article attempts to explore why China has not gone so far in the securitization of climate change, especially compared with the EU who acts as one of the securitizing actors? Methods This study mainly applies the methods of case study and comparative analysis. It draws on securitization theory as developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies to assess climate securitization practice in a critical way, with China as a case and focus. It also compares the divergent views of China and the EU on international securitization of climate change and their different approaches. Results China has been generally reluctant to climate change securitization at international level and has embraced the climate securitization at domestic level to a limited extent although it recognizes the security implications of this issue. The concerns of the political ramifications of the United Nations Security Council's involvement and different priority agenda could explain why China has not gone so far in the process of climate securitization. Conclusion The awareness of the potential security implications of climate change has been increased since the UNSC's first debate on this topic in 2007. However, there are divergent views between China and other players on the question of whether it is appropriate to consider climate change a threat to international peace and security and whether the Security Council is an appropriate forum in which to consider climate change. Meanwhile, the EU and China have responded to climate security with a converging trend in terms of mitigation.