DEFLATIONISM AS A METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION

被引:0
|
作者
Lamberov, L. D. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Ural Fed Univ, Inst Social & Polit Sci, Dept Philosophy, Philosophy, Ekaterinburg, Russia
[2] Ural Fed Univ, Inst Social & Polit Sci, Dept Philosophy, Dept Ontol & Theory Knowledge, Ekaterinburg, Russia
关键词
deflationism; metaphysics; truth; meaning; reference; fact; value;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Deflationism is a broad, diverse and very interesting trend in contemporary analytic philosophy. Deflationism pre-supposes and naturally "generate" your answer to metaphysical questions. Of course, if you take into account the nature and basic intuitions behind deflationism, the resulting metaphysical explanation seems more likely explanation for the question of correlation of language and the world, through which the number of explanations for the basic concepts is "refracted". This is, first of all, the concept of truth, reference, meaning, value and fact. Deflationary theory of truth is such a theory of truth, according to which the concept of truth is understood as metaphysically thin concept, performing the language-specific logical and linguistic functions (generalization, indirect speech, "semantic ascent"), fully explainable by the equivalence scheme. Thus, in the deflationary theories of truth it is stated that the truth has no metaphysical character and is not a property (at least, in the usual sense of the word). The common point of deflationary definition of truth and deflationary definition of reference is that the notions of truth and reference are special logical tools that greatly extends the expressive capabilities of a language. This approach leads to the construction of a theory of meaning as use, which states that meanings are not representative or relational. The meanings have the following characteristics: they are substantively and naturalistic, they are reducible to the properties of non-semantic nature, namely to the use. Deflationism can serve as an argument in favor of non-cognitivism in considering the Frege-Geach problem. Deflationism allows you to "construct" the truth conditions. This suggests that we have no criterion for distinguishing real and deflational ("fictional") facts, and facts are not really exist, but they are the case only by the adoption of such a point of view that they (and objects participating in these facts) are the case. In this case, they "exist" in accordance with the principles of a given language game. Obviously, deflationism is the opposite of realism. However, although the opposite of realism is anti-realism, there's a methodological similarity between realism and anti-realism - both realist's and anti-realist's notions of truth are epistemic concepts. According to realism and to anti-realism truth has a certain metaphysical nature, deflationism denies that the truth has underlying meta-physical nature, so deflationism is opposed to both realism and anti-realism. Thus, deflationism is not purely anti-metaphysical conception, metaphysics is only reduced, "trimmed" to a certain minimum amount.
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页码:33 / +
页数:8
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