Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network

被引：1
|
作者：
Liu Hao [1 ]
Chen Zhigang [2 ]
Zhang Lianming [3 ]
机构：
[1] Hunan Univ Humanities Sci & Technol, Inst Informat, Loudi 417000, Peoples R China
[2] Cent S Univ, Sch Informat Sci & Engn, Changsha 410083, Hunan, Peoples R China
[3] Hunan Normal Univ, Coll Phys & Informat Sci, Changsha 410081, Hunan, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF ELECTRONICS & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY | 2017年 / 39卷 / 08期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network; Selfishness; Auction model; Virtual currency; Incentive protocol;
D O I：
10.11999/JEIT161335
中图分类号：
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号：
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要：
In view of the selfishness of nodes in mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, combined with its features of the resource-constrained, self-organization and opening, this paper proposes a novel Incentive Protocol DAIP of mobile P2P network based on Double Auction model of incomplete information on both sides. The incentive mechanism adopts virtual currency payment method. The node calculates the evaluation of a message forwarding based on the virtual currency, resource state of it and the property of message, then gives the corresponding price according to the evaluation and game strategy. Through the game analysis, the linear strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium solution of DAIP strategy is given, which makes each node to maximize its own benefits, encourages them to cooperate with the message forwarding, and then improves the success rate of message forwarding in the network system. Analysis and simulation show that this incentive mechanism is able to effectively reduce the system's energy consumption, improve the success rate of message forwarding in the whole network system, and improve the overall effectiveness of the system.
引用
收藏
页码：1986 / 1992
页数：7
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