A THEOREM OF VOTING RULES AND BUDGET DEFICITS

被引：1

作者：

GROVES, T

机构：

[1] Department of Economics 0508, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1994年 / 45卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(94)90142-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A theorem showing that deficits under a procedure requiring expenditures to accompany revenues as they are enacted, followed by a vote on the size of deficit, are smaller than under current procedure in which votes on expenditures and taxes are unlinked.

引用

页码：237 / 243

页数：7

共 50 条

[1] Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections
Simon Luechinger
Christoph A. Schaltegger
International Tax and Public Finance, 2013, 20 : 785 - 807
[2] Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections
Luechinger, Simon
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, 2013, 20 (05) : 785 - 807
[3] The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules
Yang, Yonjie
ALGORITHMIC DECISION THEORY, ADT 2021, 2021, 13023 : 224 - 240
[4] A GENERALIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CAMBRIDGE THEOREM WITH BUDGET DEFICITS
DALZIEL, P
CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1991, 15 (03) : 287 - 300
[5] Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules
Miller, Nicholas R.
PUBLIC CHOICE, 2019, 179 (1-2) : 113 - 124
[6] Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules
Nicholas R. Miller
Public Choice, 2019, 179 : 113 - 124
[7] Fiscal policy rules, budget deficits, and forecasting biases
Baldi, Guido
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM, 2016, 19 (02) : 185 - 194
[8] A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules
Mark Fey
Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, 20 : 27 - 32
[9] A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules
Fey, M
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2003, 20 (01) : 27 - 32
[10] Voting over efficient decision rules in budget-balanced organizations
Hueth, B
Melkonyan, T
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2003, 51 (02) : 279 - 301

← 1 2 3 4 5 →