OVERFUNDED DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN SETTLEMENTS WITHOUT ASSET REVERSIONS

被引:12
|
作者
HAW, IM [1 ]
JUNG, KY [1 ]
LILIEN, SB [1 ]
机构
[1] CUNY BERNARD M BARUCH COLL,NEW YORK,NY 10010
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1991年 / 14卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-4101(91)90016-H
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines why firms settle their overfunded defined benefit pension plans. Under the new accounting standard (FASB Statement No. 88), companies 'settling' their overfunded pension plan can immediately recognize a portion of deffered pension gain as current earnings. Focusing on settlement transactions unaccompanied by asset reversions, we examine financial characteristics of settlement firms, including earnings, debt covenants, management incentive compensation, and firms' risk and financial structures. Our results suggest that firms undertake settlement to offset a decline in earnings and mitigate restrictive debt covenant constraints. However, a settlement firm's systematic risk (beta) does not change after settlement. © 1991.
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页码:295 / 320
页数:26
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