Russia's centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections

被引:2
|
作者
Golosov, Grigorii V. [1 ]
机构
[1] European Univ St Petersburg, Polit Sci & Sociol Dept, Gagarinskaya 6-1 A, St Petersburg 191187, Russia
关键词
Authoritarianism; elections; municipal government; regional government; Russia;
D O I
10.1177/2233865918789521
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
While formally a federation that vests significant powers in the sub-national bodies of government and leaves it for its federal units and municipalities to decide who will govern them by conducting elections, the Russian Federation is effectively a centralized authoritarian state. This paper uses evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections in Russia to examine the role of formal political institutions in sustaining the country's political regime. The analysis shows that the political domination of the pro-government party over the regional political assemblies is sustained by a complex combination of party regulations and electoral rules. In particular, gubernatorial elections are organized and conducted in a way that ensures the victories of the incumbent governors who are effectively appointed by the president of Russia.
引用
收藏
页码:231 / 248
页数:18
相关论文
共 8 条