This article addresses the arguments presented in The Bell Curve in terms of their scientific validity for the context in which they are situated and their value as a basis for social policy in Canada, The article is organized in four sections. In the first I argue that cognitive stratification is less ominous than Herrnstein and Murray indicate, and that the meaning of stratification is dependent on the cultural context. In the second I discuss the nature of intelligence, argue that The Bell Curve relies on an impoverished view of it, and suggest that the ''intelligence'' data they analyze should be seen rather as measuring educational achievement. I describe some of the other limitations in their data analyses in the third section, in particular their underestimate of environmental effects. In the final section, I address two of their conclusions, dealing with removal of support from unwed mothers and their children, and with the shifting of resources from programs for the disadvantaged to programs for the gifted. I argue that Herrnstein and Murray focus too much on symptoms and not enough on causes, and that their analyses are bound to the American context. Contrary to Herrnstein and Murray, I conclude that education for ail remains important and that efforts should be continued to understand how intelligence develops and how it can be better nurtured.
