SIGNALING DIFFICULTIES WITH LINKAGE IN CRISIS BARGAINING

Although the possibility of solving crises by the parties trading concessions on different issues is attractive in theory, linkage is rarely done in practice. Offers to link issues could be misinterpreted as signals of weakness, leading to their rejection. The fear of such an opportunistic rejection discourages senders from offering linkage. This paper examines a signaling game of linkage in crisis bargaining. One side has a choice of linked and unlinked offers, whereas the other side could accept or reject either offer, or go to war. Each side could be one of two types, based on their knowledge of the attractiveness of war for the sender and the attractiveness of the added issue for the receiver. Linkage succeeds in the model only under particular conditions. Paradoxically, the possibility that linkage may lead to an attack often promotes its success. Linkage is most likely to succeed when the sender is stronger than the receiver, but not overwhelmingly so. A large first strike advantage for the receiver makes linkage more likely.