Frankenstein in Europe: the impact of the European Central Bank on the eurozone crisis' management

Since its creation in 1999, the European Central Bank has been trying to weigh on the rules of the eurozone economic governance, even though its official responsibilities are strictly restricted to monetary issues. In this context, the 2009 sovereign debt crisis has been a window of opportunity for the ECB to exert an unprecedented influence on these issues. The main aim of this article is thus to analyze how the ECB managed to extend its influence beyond its official monetary responsibilities during the crisis. Following the assumption that the ECB is a political player, I explore the three channels through which it had an impact on the eurozone economic governance: its monopoly on liquidities, the recognition of its expertise on financial issues and its moral authority on member states. The main research findings of this study are the unexpected lack of control of political representatives over the ECB politics during the crisis and the central role of the policymakers' misperceptions on the ECB during the crisis-solving process.