On autonomy and dignity as a basis for justification of human rights

The philosophical justification of human rights remains one of the major challenges in the areas of moral philosophy, political philosophy and legal philosophy. At the heart of this debate, both in the academy and in the public sphere in general, there are always fundamental questions: what are and for what do human rights serve? Now, these questions imply in analyzing whether human rights have any effectively normative force and the assumptions on which they are based. In this context, the use of Kant's thought must also be questioned: to what extent does Kant offer (or do not offer) robust moral arguments for a reasonable justification of human rights? What role does his notion of dignity play in this context? In the following I focus on the first chapter (Human Rights) of Caranti's book entitled "The foundation of human rights: the dignity approach". My interest is focused on Caranti's considerations about the concept of dignity and some aspects related to Kant's thinking in this context.