Navigating the One-on-One Model of Accountability: Lessons for Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables through the Lens of Principal-Agent Theory

Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)-single, locally elected politicians-were introduced in 2012 with the intention of strengthening local control over policing, by shifting oversight of chief constables away from the Home Office and police authorities. This article examines the new power dynamics that have emerged with this shift, paying particular attention to the role of conflict in relationships between PCCs and chief constables. It argues that in some instances, the reform introduced conflict between incumbent chiefs and newly elected PCCs, compounded by the one-on-one dynamic between PCCs and chiefs. The article presents principal-agent theory as a theoretical framework that can better understand how conflict can be managed, and draws upon observations from two distinct-albeit related-pieces of research conducted in England and Wales and the USA to make recommendations on how PCC-chief constable relationships can be navigated.