RECONCILING REASON AND RELIGION - ON DWORKIN AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Using Ronald Dworkin's most recent book as his point of departure, Professor Stacy's Article explores the role of reason and religion in the moral and constitutional treatment of abortion and euthanasia. In Life's Dominion, Dworkin contends that the abortion and euthanasia controversies revolve around a widely shared but differently interpreted notion that human life has an intrinsic and objective value apart from any subjective value it has for its holder or other persons. Professor Stacy argues that this notion fails to advance and, indeed, retards the moral debate. The most fundamental problem is that Dworkin's notion of intrinsic value largely removes reason from the arena. No rational standards apparently exist for choosing among competing interpretations of intrinsic value, ascribing such value, or deciding the weight it should receive in relation to life's subjective value to its holder or other persons. Reason's role is diminished still further by the difficulty, if not impossibility, of giving a meaningful and plausible account of the differences between a thing's intrinsic value and its subjective value to persons. Professor Stacy argues that Dworkin's goals of establishing the commensurability of opposing views and of corroding dogmatism necessitate increased reliance on reason, and his Article suggests an approach for accomplishing this. Professor Stacy also maintains that Dworkin's notion of intrinsic value leads him to a misguided theory of constitutional religious liberty. Teasing out the conceptions of religion, free exercise, and establishment implicit in Life's Dominion, Professor Stacy demonstrates how the notion of intrinsic value impels Dworkin to embrace a theory that identifies suprarationality as a defining feature of religious belief and that includes in this category only belief in a transcendent reality such as God or intrinsic value. This theory fails to give nonbelievers' fundamental beliefs the protection demanded by the underlying values of constitutional religious freedom. It also slights the role that reason plays in the formation and the revision of the religious beliefs of believers. The Article begins the large task of outlining a conception of religious liberty in which reason plays a prominent role. This conception hews to religious liberty's underlying values, which include the fundamental beliefs of nonbelievers who reject both God and Dworkinian intrinsic value, and supports Dworkin's ultimate constitutional conclusion that the Court should treat abortion and euthanasia as inherently religious subjects.