Increased compensation costs as an externality of mandatory executive compensation disclosure: evidence from Canada

被引：2
|
作者：
Gelinas, Patrice [1 ]
Magnan, Michel [2 ]
St-Onge, Sylvie [3 ]
机构：
[1] York Univ, Sch Adm Studies, Atkinson Fac Liberal & Profess Studies, 4700 Keele St,Atkinson Bldg,Off 254, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[2] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, Montreal, PQ H3G 1M8, Canada
[3] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT | 2009年 / 2卷 / 03期
关键词：
executive compensation; disclosure regulation; Canada; CEO compensation; governance; public policy; regulatory environment; empirical study; publicly traded firms; private firms; business environment;
D O I：
10.1504/IJBE.2009.023797
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
As Canadian policy makers review the disclosure expectations regarding executive compensation paid by publicly traded companies, we investigate how the implementation of mandatory executive compensation disclosure impacts executive compensation levels. A regression analysis of Canadian CEOs' pay increases between 1992 and 1997 reveals that disclosure regulation disciplines some firms to align the pay with that of relevant peers, but it stimulates others to target the top pay level in the market.
引用
收藏
页码：376 / 390
页数：15
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