Crusading between the Adriatic and the Black Sea: Hungary, Venice and the Ottoman Empire after the Fall of Negroponte

In early 1474, almost ten years had elapsed since Matthias Corvinus' last and failed major anti-Ottoman attempt. The rather peculiar, given previous and later events and developments, Habsburg-Hunyadi 'crusader' plan of 1466-1467 had ended in the Transylvanian rebellion and the ensuing Moldavian campaign of king Matthias. Over the next years, the king focused on his Bohemian and Habsburg problems and claims, while the crusader plans drafted in 1471 were once again basically brought to a halt by another conspiracy against John Hunyadi's son. Less than three years later, the Ottoman raid on Oradea (Nagyvarad, Grosswardein), as well as Venetian financial offers, compelled the king to re-take anti-Ottoman action. His unsuccessful negotiations with sultan Mehmed II (1472-1473), alongside the aid rendered during the Walachian-Moldavian conflict to Stephen III of Moldavia (1470/1471-1473), also brought back the king to the crusader frontline. While having to restore good connections to pope Sixtus IV, eager, in return to strengthen his Western credit by crusader actions and plans, Matthias Corvinus had also to deal with the Habsburg and Jagellonian attempts to weaken his position and diminish his influence in crusader matters too, in Hungary as well as in the neighboring areas. Newfound sources, namely Italian, Milanese in particular, archival data, provided the grounds for new perspectives on Matthias Corvinus' Ottoman and anti-Ottoman actions in the mid 1470'. They allow us to take a closer look at the chain of events, decisions, propaganda, rivalry and disinformation that led to the Habsburg-Jagellonian charges of 'crusader incompetence' against Matthias Corvinus and also to the failure of the planned Hungarian-Moldavian 'trap' for sultan Mehmed II in the second half of 1476. Most of the explanations for it can be looked up in the immediate political context, complicated by the anti-Ottoman Muslim talks, by Usun Hassan's failure, respectively by the conflicts between Tartar factions. Yet, as in many cases of similar nature, the main explanations usually rely on quite simple facts. The 'anti-Ottoman' coalition of the mid 1470' consisted basically of former, more recent or traditional, rivals, such as the Rome, Venice, Hungary or Moldavia, which had a direct impact on the outcome of their crusader style attempts and actions. Another important aspect which should be emphasized in this context is the relation between Matthias and Transylvania after 1467, in connection to the local Transylvanian ties, via Walachia, with the Turk. Such structural details, beyond the various forms of modern, but also medieval, bias, have ensured an almost constant advantage to the Ottoman Empire, more and more a partner, rather than an enemy.