WHO SHOULD REGULATE LAWYERS

For most of this century, disciplinary agencies acting under the supervision of state supreme courts have been primarily responsible for enforcing the rules of professional responsibility. During the last decade, however, these agencies have been joined by a number of other systems designed to detect and deter unethical conduct. These alternatives have provoked heated debate about whether and under what circumstances lawyers should be subject to various forms of external regulation. In this Article, Professor Wilkins provides a framework for understanding and evaluating this debate. The analysis separates the many arguments for and against particular enforcement systems into two general categories: compliance arguments, which are efficiency claims about the costs and benefits of using a particular form of control, and independence arguments, which seek to link regulatory systems to the virtues of an independent legal profession. Professor Wilkins argues that credible assertions of either of these claims must account for relevant differences among professional norms and among various markets for legal services. He therefore analyzes compliance and independence arguments in terms of a matrix of lawyer-client interactions that highlights these differences. Based on this examination, Professor Wilkins reasons that a system of multiple controls can be both efficient and compatible with a proper understanding of professional independence. He concludes by setting out some tentative proposals as to how such a system might be constructed.