The article describes a group of Soviet and German troops involved in combat operations from June 22 to July 6 1941; the oncoming tank battle in the area of Lutsk, Dubno, Rovno, requiring a lot of effort from the aviation front which consisted in daily organization of 600 sorties from June 22 to 30, yet defeated due to the uncoordinated acts different kinds of troops. Analysing aviation activity, the author concludes that fighters led the struggle for air superiority primarily by patrolling above the ground forces, the most important objects, accompanied by attack aircrafts; air raids on enemy airfields in this case were not organized, which allowed the enemy to feel safe on "their territory". Actions of the South-western Front Air Force, as noted by the researcher, allowed reducing the combat capabilities of German armoured and motorized formations, but the final results of air strikes did not satisfy the Front Military Council. The efforts of the front air force were "sprayed" on numerous targets. Such actions more severely affected only the rear of the column and transports of the enemy, but they did not exert serious influence on the course of the cross-border battle. The article notes the reasons for unsatisfactory performance of the air reconnaissance; compares the reports on casualties in the fighting along the line of staff and political personnel; identifies a feature that while on other fronts they exaggerated the losses of the enemy (sometimes significantly), the Ukraine somehow lowered the data about the success of the aviation front; characterizes the losses of units of the 4th Air Force and military aviation of the enemy; shows the losses of the Soviet Air Force Front, whose combat losses by the end of June amounted to 697, total to 911 aircrafts. The practical significance of this paper is that it partially closes the gaps in the study of the fighting troops of the boundary cover, and researchers dealing with the war can use its factual material. The main causes of failures and losses, according to the author, were inadequate operational training senior officers, the lack of a clear interaction between different kinds of troops, lack of trained young pilots and confusion of the command. Concluding the article, the author notes that during 15 days of fighting the Soviet troops of 864 600 people (excluding the data of the 18th Army) suffered irrecoverable and sanitation losses of 241 594 people, and the air force lost 1218 combat aircrafts. The depth of withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the border was 300350 miles, and only at the price of a great loss the Front's troops with air support slowed the main enemy force in Kiev direction and thereby allowed the front of the main forces to withdraw and take up defence in the fortified areas of the old state border.
