A Strategic Assessment of Iraq

Some might argue that the origin of the civil war in Iraq can be traced back to the attack on the Samara mosque setting sectarian divisions aflame in February 2006. Others might point to Viceroy Paul Bremer's decision to disband the Army, de-ba'athify the Civil Service, and privatize state industries. Together these decisions put over half a million unemployed on the street overnight. Some might argue the looting, combined with weapons caches spread throughout the country, helped create a culture of anarchy over which US-led forces never quite regained control because there were too few troops. Others will point to the inability to seal the borders and thus prohibit support to insurgents. These were critical events in the slide to civil war, no doubt, but this article argues that the military strategy of the United States was compromised before the armed forces left US soil for two reasons. First there were irreconcilable tensions between US grand strategy and its military plans. Second, a fatal flaw in US grand strategy, which conflated al-Qaeda with Saddam Hussein, encouraged Washington into an unnecessary war of choice that had no relationship to the very real and present dangers confronting America. Using Clausewitz as a guide, this article suggests some alternative options for America's long-term security.