A UNIFYING APPROACH TO EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIA

被引：32
|
作者：
BALDER, EJ
机构：
[1] Mathematical Institute, University of Utrecht, TA Utrecht
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1995年 / 24卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1007/BF01258205
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
An approach initiated in [4] is shown to unify results about the existence of (i) Nash equilibria in games with at most countably many players, (ii) Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions for large, anonymous games, and (iii) Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) for continuum games. A new, central notion of mixed externality is developed for this purpose.
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页码：79 / 94
页数：16
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