A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections

被引:0
|
作者
Karpov, A. V. [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Res Univ, Higher Sch Econ, Moscow, Russia
关键词
Elections; board of directors; equilibrium seats distribution; d'Hondt method;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Game-theoretic model of election to a corporate board of directors is proposed. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution of seats is unique. The uniqueness guarantees nonmanipulability of elections. The distribution is obtained by the d'Hondt method of seats distribution in proportional representation problem. The model is tested on real data from a Russian company.
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页码:10 / 23
页数:14
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